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HARPEROONING, GROEING AND 
BROWNING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Mark A. Graber* 
Many scholars on the political left complain about the 
"Lochnerization of the First Amendment."' Free speech has been 
"Lochnerized" in their view, partly because the First Amendment is 
presently interpreted as guaranteeing far more protection for the speech 
of the politically powerful than for the speech of unpopular dissenters. 
Recent Supreme Court decisions provide billionaires and corporations 
with far more valuable expression rights2 than ordinary citizens who are 
finding their capacity to reach audiences substantially curbed.3 Free 
speech has also been "Lochnerized" because contemporary free speech 
law resembles Lochner v. New York' in crucial dimensions. Just as Jus-
tice Rufus Peckham in Lochner insisted that the Supreme Court had no 
business leveling the contractual playing field, and should remain neutral 
between employers and employees during the bargaining process,5 the 
contemporary judicial majority maintains that federal justices have no 
business leveling the political playing field and should remain neutral be-
tween the rich and poor, as well as between corporations and human be-
ings, during the electoral process.6 Mark Tushnet observes, "[t]he First 
Amendment (has) become this generation's vision of economic substan-
* 
1. Morton J. Horwitz, Forward, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without 
Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 109 (1993). See David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 190, 211 (David Kairys ed., 3rd ed. 1998) ("The First 
Amendment as interpreted by today's conservatives constitutes a constitutional barrier to political 
reform much like the constitutional barrier to economic reform erected by conservative justices in the 
Lochner era of the early 1900s."). 
2. See generally McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. , 131 S. 
Ct. 2653 (2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
3. See, e.g. , Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2011); Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 
288 (1984). 
4. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
5. Id. at 64. 
6. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 350 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) 
("[R]eject[ing] the premise that Government has an interest 'in equalizing the relative ability of indi-
viduals and groups to influence the outcome of elections. "'). 
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tive due process, a constitutional right restricting the ability of legisla-
tures to regulate business. ''7 
Constitutional activists on the political left, who in the past sought 
to Harperoon the First Amendment, are presently attempting to "gRoe'' 
and Brown the First Amendment. Progressive writings assert that the 
main beneficiaries of free speech law ought to be the main beneficiaries 
of such Supreme Court decisions as Harper v. Virginia State Board of 
Elections," Roe v. Wade,Y or Brown v. Board of Education,111 and that con-
stitutional protections for free speech should be derived from the same 
constitutional principles that justify the right to vote, the right to choose 
to have an abortion and make other intimate decisions, or the rights as-
sociated with an anti-subordination interpretation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.U Professor Alexander 
Tsesis's Free Speech Constitutionalism 12 is an especially welcomed addi-
tion to this literature on the broader foundations of expression rights. 
Tsesis is unusually self-conscious in his effort to link free speech theory 
to fundamental constitutional principles. In sharp contrast to such schol-
ars as John Hart Ely, David A.J. Richards, or Catharine McKinnon, who 
attempt to Harperoon gRoe or Brown the First Amendment,13 Tsesis of-
fers the political left a way to integrate Harper, Roe, and Brown into a 
constitutional whole. 
Free Speech Constitutionalism maintains that constitutional protec-
tions for free speech are part of a basic regime project that predates the 
Constitution. Tsesis writes, "[t]he values for which the First Amendment 
stands should ... be understood in the context of a wider ideal of liberty 
and equality that is derived from the nation's core principles as they are 
set out in the Declaration of Independence and Preamble to the 
Constitution.''14 He recognizes the historical connections between the 
First Amendment and significant progressive constitutional achieve-
ments. ''Freedom of speech was essential,'' Tsesis declares, for ''the ad-
vancement of civil rights, gender equality, and most recently, the gay 
rights movement." 1' As important, Tsesis details the jurisprudential and 
doctrinal connections between free speech rights and the other central 
commitments of contemporary constitutional progressivism. He insists 
7. Mark Tushnct, ffltroduction: Reflections on the First Amendment and the Information Fcon-
omy, 127 HARV. L. Rf-V. 2234, 224t-i (2014). 
8. 31'13 u.s. 663 (1966). 
9. 410U.S.113(1973). 
10. 347 u.s. 41'13 (1954). 
11 . See notes 23-33, infra. For the anti-subordination interpretation of Brown. sec Jack M. Rat-
kin and Reva R. Siegel. The American Civil RiJ?hts Tradition: Aflliclassification or Antis11bordination?, 
51'\ U. MIAMI L. Rf-V. 9 (2003). 
12. Alexander Tscsis. Free Speech Constitutionalism, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015). 
13. See notes 23-33 and accompanying text, infra. 
14. Tsesis, supra note 12, at 104. 
15. !d. at 106. 
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that free speech rights can be derived from the same principles that justi-
fy the right to vote, the right to choose an abortion or make other inti-
mate decisions, and the right to not be the victim of racialized, gender-
ized, or other forms of subordination. These constitutional commitments, 
articulated by both the Declaration and Preamble, 
recognize that humans have equal innate entitlements to pursue 
happiness and that representative government is created to enact 
institutions, laws and regulations effective in protecting those rights. 
Such a regimen is not only good for persons atomistically but for 
the national community because it recognizes that each of us has 
the right to explore his or her unique life plan, including expressive 
aims, without undue restraints. 16 
In short, Tsesis would Harperoon, gRoe and Brown the First 
Amendment. 
Professor Tsesis's project of integrating the First Amendment into 
broader constitutional theory is both necessary and problematic. Those 
who Lochnerize, Harperoon gRoe, Brown or, for that matter, Hellerize 
the First Amendment correctly recognize that no constitutional provision 
is an island. Americans from the founding to the present have considered 
free speech rights to be vital aspects of a more general constitutional pro-
ject, even as Americans had disputed the nature of that project, the pre-
cise protections for free speech necessary for that project, the other 
rights entailed by that project, and even whether that project requires 
constitutional protections for free speech be explicitly enumerated. The 
First Amendment nevertheless has always been somewhat insulated from 
broader constitutional projects. Constitutional protections for free 
speech have a partly autonomous doctrinal history and a partly distinc-
tive mission that is partly subversive of all broader constitutional visions. 
Constitutional free speech rights create a space in which citizens can 
choose between the constitutional projects articulated in Lochner, 
Harper, Roe, Brown, or Heller. 17 Tsesis is right to acknowledge that the 
reigning interpretation of free speech rights can never be entirely neutral 
between competing constitutional projects, but nor should the First 
Amendment be entirely subsumed by any particular constitutional pro-
ject. 
I. ACCESSORTZTNG THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Americans have historically made functional and doctrinal connec-
tions between free speech and other constitutional rights. Many com-
16. hi. at 105. 
17. Or, JS I show later, some rnix of each. 
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mentators believe broad free exercise rights are practical preconditions 
to Americans enjoying any other constitutional right. Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut declared the "freedom of thought and 
speech" was "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every 
other form of freedom." 18 As often, commentators claim that free speech 
rights are one aspect of a more general constitutional commitment, a 
commitment that, depending on the commentator may generate such 
rights as the freedom of contract, the right to vote, reproductive freedom, 
racial equality, and even the right to bear arms. 
The conservative libertarians of the nineteenth century Lochnerized 
the First Amendment. They believed the Supreme Court should protect 
the freedom of speech for the same reason that the Justices protected the 
freedom of contract in Lochner v. New York. Both freedoms were as-
pects of the more general right to "be free in the enjoyment of all of 
[one's] faculties." 19 Justice James McReynolds in Meyer v. Nebraska of-
fered the classic expression of the connections between property rights 
and speech rights when upholding the right to teach German. The liberty 
protected by the due process clause, he declared 
denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right 
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occu-
pations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a 
home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dic-
tates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges 
long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.2'l 
Herbert Spencer insisted ''[t]he law of supply and demand extends 
from the material sphere to the mental sphere.'' In his view, "as interfer-
ence with the supply and demand of commodities is mischievous, so is 
interference with the supply and demand of cultured faculty. ''!1 
New Deal and Great Society liberals Harperooned the First 
Amendment. They believed the Supreme Court should protect the free-
dom for speech for the same reason that the Justices protected the right 
to vote in Harper v. Virginia Board of ELections. Both are aspects of the 
more general constitutional commitment to democratic majoritarianism. 
The famous Carolene Products footnote is the classic expression of the 
constitutional connections between voting rights and speech rights. Chief 
Justice Stone suggested that "more exacting judicial scrutiny" might be 
appropriate in the case of "legislation which restricts those political pro-
18. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 31\1,326-27 (1937). 
19. Allgeyer v. Louisiana , 165 U.S. 57il., 589 (1i'.Y7). 
20. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 3\10,39\1 (1\123). 
21 . Hl-'I~ HI-'RI'SPr.:..UR , FACTSA:..DC0MMEXIS!::3 (1902). 
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cesses which can ordinarily be expected to bring about the repeal of un-
desirable legislation,'' citing as examples judicial decisions in cases con-
cerning "restrictions upon the right to vote" and "restraints upon the dis-
semination of information."22 John Hart Ely claimed that Warren Court 
decisions protecting expression and voting rights were both derived from 
a judicial "desire to ensure that the political process ... was open to 
those of all viewpoints on something approaching an equal basis."2' 
Radical civil libertarians gRoe the First AmendmentY They believe 
the Supreme Court should protect the freedom of speech for the same 
reasons that the Justices protected the right to an abortion in Roe v. 
Wade. Both rights are aspects of the more general constitutional com-
mitment to individual self-development and the freedom to make certain 
intimate choices. Justice William 0. Douglas in his concurrence in Doe v. 
Bolton offered the classical expression of the constitutional connection 
between speech and reproductive choice. His opinion interpreted the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting "autonomous 
control over the development and expression of one's intellect, interests, 
tastes, and personality"25 and from that commitment derived both the 
right to political dissent and the right to terminate a pregnancy.26 David 
A. J. Richards declares that government must show "respect for the in-
dependent moral judgment of each person, who must stand as ultimate 
arbiter of conscience and of the legitimacy of the claims of state and 
community," a principle from which he deduces rights to "sexual imagi-
nation and its expression. ''27 
Proponents of critical race and gender studies prefer to Brown the 
First Amendment_Zo They believe the Supreme Court should protect the 
freedom of speech for the same reason that the Justices protected racial 
equality in Brown v. Board of Education. Both rights are aspects of a 
more general constitutional commitment to anti-subordination or "the 
universal right to self-respect and self-realization.''29 Mari Matsuda 
champions the constitutional principle that "each person ... is entitled to 
basic dignity, to nondiscrimination, and to the freedom to participate ful-
22. United States v. Carolcne Products , 304 U.S. 144, 154 n.4 (l<J3X). 
23 . JOH'< HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTIH:$'1'; A THEORY OF JL:DICIAI. REVIEW 74 ( l <J!)IJ). 
24. For a brief discussion of radical civil libertarianism, sec Mark A. Graber, Old Wine in New 
Roffles: The Constitutional Sraws of Unconstitutional Speech, 48 VA'<D. L. RFv. 349. 356-59 ( I 995). 
25. Doc v. Bolton , 410 U.S. 179,211 (1973) (Douglas, J. , concurring). See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558. 562 (2003) (''Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought. belief. 
expression , and certain intimate conduct."). 
26. Doe, 410 U .S. at 211. 
27. DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOI.FR ATION Ar\D TH F COr\STI'l'UTIOr\ 207-01:: (1 9l\6). 
21::. This paragraph borrows from the lengthier discussion in Graber, supra note 24, at 359-66. 
29. Mary Ellen Gale, Reimagining the First 1\mendment: Racist Speech and F.q1wf Uberty , 65 ST. 
JOH'<'S L. REV. 119, 126 (1 Y<JI ). 
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ly in society."111 Those who would Brown the First Amendment differ 
from those who would Lochnerize, Harperoon, and gRoe the First 
Amendment, in their greater willingness to invoke their master principles 
for restricting expression rights. From the claim that Brown held that 
''racism is a form of subordination that achieves its purposes through 
group defamation," Charles Lawrence concludes that a Browned First 
Amendment "commits us to some regulation of racist speech."' ' "When 
equality is recognized as a constitutional value and mandate,'' Catharine 
MacKinnon agrees, "social inferiority cannot be imposed through any 
means, including expressive ones."'2 
A growing strain in American constitutional thought Hellerizes the 
First Amendment. Champions of an individual right to bear arms believe 
the Supreme Court should protect the freedom of speech for the same 
reason the Justices protected the right to bear arms in District of Colum-
bia v. Heller:'3 Both rights are aspects of the more general constitutional 
commitment to providing citizens with the means to resist tyranny. 
Sanford Levinson suggests the connections between speech and gun 
rights when he notes, ''just as ordinary citizens should participate actively 
in governmental decision-making through offering their own deliberative 
insights, rather than be confined to casting ballots once every two or four 
years for those very few individuals who will actually make decisions, so 
should ordinary citizens participate in the process of law enforcement 
and defense of liberty rather than rely on professionalized peacekeepers, 
whether we call them standing armies or police. ·•_\4 Glenn H. Reynolds 
and Brannon P. Denning, more committed advocates of a broad inter-
pretation of the right to bear arms, point out that "the First and Second 
Amendments share a common liberty-protecting heritage, so that bor-
rowing from the former to implement the latter naturally follows."" 
II. THE TSESIS INTEGRATION 
Professor Tsesis proposes to Harperoon , gRoe, and Brown the First 
Amendment, but not Lochnerize or Hellerize free speech. He complains 
30. Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, in WORDS 
THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVH SPEECH, A~D THH FIRST AMENIJME~T 4l\ 
(1993). 
31. Charles R Lawrence Ill, If He Hollers l£t Him Go: Ref?ulating Racist Speech on Campus, in 
WORDS THATW<)l: ~D: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAL:I :riVF SPEECH, A~D THE fiRST A\1H~IJMENT 
75, 5X (1993), 
32. CATHARI~E A. MACKI~~O~, O~I .Y WORDS 1 OX (1'!93). 
33. 554 u.s. 570 (2001))_ 
34. Sanford V. Levinson. The F:mbarrassing Second Amendment, 'J'J YALE L.J. 637. 650-51 
(191>'!), For similar themes, sec L.A. Powe, Jr., Guns, Word.~. and Constiflltional Interpretation, 3X 
WII.I.IA\1 A~D MAin L. Rr.v. 1311 (1997). 
35. Glenn H. Reynolds and Brannon P. Denning, How to Stop Worrying and l£am to Love the 
Second Amendment: A Reply to Prof'essor Magarian, 91 TFx. L. RFv. See also 89, YO (201 3). 
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that progressives who tie free speech closely to only one set of progres-
sive constitutional commitments merely create larger constitutional is-
lands. Too often, Tsesis maintains, while free speech scholars "accurately 
portray some of the purposes protecting and advancing free speech," 
they ''think of them as independent values rather than part of a greater 
scheme."36 If free speech is to be integrated with other liberal commit-
ments, then free speech should be integrated with all liberal commit-
ments. Hence, deriving free speech rights from the same underlying prin-
ciple that justifies the right to vote, the right to an abortion, and the right 
to desegregated schools or anti-subordination makes more sense than 
closely connecting free speech with only one of these other rights, leaving 
the others to fend for themselves. 
A progressive theory of free speech, Professor Tsesis insists, should 
be derived from the central principles of progressive constitutional 
thought and be connected to all progressive values. He Harperoons the 
First Amendment when declaring, "[f]ree speech is a necessary predicate 
for members of a representative democracy to voice their separate opin-
ions and to compromise in the interest of community unity.''37 He gRoes 
the First Amendment when emphasizing the value of "expressive self-
definition"'" and "the dignitary interest of each autonomous individual."'Y 
He Browns the First Amendment when asserting that ''[c]itizens partici-
pating in majoritarian voting lack the electoral power to prevent equal 
participation in public debate and self-expressions"4u and that hate 
speech that ''threatens the happiness of individuals and their allies, influ-
ences others to exclude identifiable groups, and disrupts multicultural 
tranquility" is not constitutionally protected.41 Tsesis makes clear that the 
Harper, Roe, and Brown dimensions of free speech stand together and 
do not reflect independent constitutional commitments. His entire pro-
ject, ''Free Speech Constitutionalism,'' can be deduced from ''the abstract 
principle that government must protect equal rights in order to benefit 
the common good.''42 
Free Speech Constitutionalism is sharply critical of progressive theo-
ries of free speech that exclude some progressive constitutional commit-
ments. Those who would Harperoon the First Amendment by focusing 
on the role free speech plays in democratic majoritarianism overlook the 
crucial role free speech plays as a means of human development. "It is 
unfathomable to think,'' Tsesis declares, "the government could regulate 
persons speaking to themselves in a bathroom, making mock gestures in 
36. Tscsis, supra note 12. at 113. 
37. hi. at 107. 
38. hi. at 113. 
39. hi. at 114. 
40. hi. at 12'!. 
41. hi. at 147. 
42. hi. at 103. 
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a closet while getting dressed, reading the lines of a seditious play to a 
mirror, singing aloud in the woods, and yet none of them contribute to 
participatory democracy."43 Those who would only gRoe the First 
Amendment by emphasizing the vital role of self-expression to the hu-
man personality undervalue the contribution free speech makes to dem-
ocratic majoritarianism. Tsesis points out that the "self-fulfillment model 
does not satisfactorily explain why free speech doctrine treats public def-
amation differently than the private variety, since in both types of defa-
mation the speaker might personally enjoy spreading untrue statements 
about the object of his anger. "44 
Professor Tsesis does not Lochnerize or Hellerize the First 
Amendment. Free Speech Constitutionalism does not discuss possible 
connections between free speech and either the freedom of contract or 
the right to bear arms, but Tsesis elsewhere makes clear that neither can 
be derived as fundamental constitutional principles. He declares ''sus-
pect ... the Court's attempt to link an individual's right to bear arms 
with the Declaration of Independence."45 He thinks Lochner analogous 
to Dred Scott v. Sandford4(; as ''obvious examples of judicial manipulation 
of the Constitution to suit the justices' political and economic 
worldviews."47 For these reasons, progressive theories of free speech 
need not integrate the freedom of contract or the right to bear arms into 
a broader constitutional vision. 
Nevertheless, Tsesis has provided persons who do not share his pro-
gressive constitutional vision with a road map for constructing a First 
Amendment more true to their constitutional faith. Integrating the free-
dom of contract and the right to bear arms into a broader free speech 
theory is not difficult. Those who would Lochnerize and those who 
would gRoe the First Amendment differ for the most part only over the 
rights they believe are necessary for human development. Justice 
McReynolds thought such rights included the freedom of contract and 
the freedom of speech. Justice Douglas thought such rights included the 
right to intimate relationships and the freedom of speech. A libertarian 
might think such rights include the freedom of contract, the right to inti-
mate relationships, and the freedom of speech.4x Those who would 
Hellerize and those who would Harperoon the First Amendment differ 
primarily over what rights they believe are necessary for a participatory 
43 . hi. at 124. 
44. hi. at 131. 
45. Alexander Tscsis. Seff-Govemment and the Declaration of' Independence, <)7 CORNFI.I. L. 
RFV. 6<)3, 701 n.24 (2012). 
46. 60 u.s. 393 (1~56). 
47. Alexander Tsesis, Maxim Constitllfionafism: l.ibeml F.quafity for the Common Good, 91 
TFX. L. RFV. 16()<), 1667 (2013). 
4~. For one version of this argument, sec generally RANDY E. flARKFTT, RFSTORI'<G THF LOST 
CONS ITI VI'H)K; THE PI~ESUMI"I'I<)K Of< LIHFR I'Y (revised cd. 2013). 
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democracy to flourish. Pro-gun advocates believe the right to bear arms 
furthers participatory democracy.49 Anti-gun advocates do not."'l 
More generally, Professor Tsesis has provided a major challenge to 
the dominant mode of constructing a constitutional theory of free 
speech. Such classical free speech theorists as Alexander Meiklejohn and 
Thomas Emerson began by exploring values free speech served and then 
constructed free speech doctrine to serve those values.51 Free Speech 
Constitutionalism begins from a better place. Professor Tsesis asks what 
values the broader constitutional order serves and then constructs free 
speech doctrine to serve those values. Progressives and non-progressives 
who do not share Tsesis's interpretation of the Declaration of 
Independence may nevertheless rely heavily on his method when devel-
oping theories of free speech that better integrated what they believe are 
the most fundamental constitutional rights and norms. 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A PARTLY AUTONOMOUS 
CONSTITUTIONAL NORM 
Free speech is not a constitutional island, but neither are constitu-
tional visions undifferentiated land masses in which all provisions fit 
seamlessly with each other. Constitutions are disharmonic, containing 
provisions and strands that clash as often as they complement.52 Speech 
rights in disharmonic constitutions simultaneously promote and obstruct 
various regime purposes. Sometimes, speech clauses contribute to a par-
ticular constitutional vision. At other times, free speech is the means by 
which alternative constitutional visions are kept open. Even if at the pre-
sent time we choose to Harperoon, gRoe, and Brown the First Amend-
ment, the constitutional protections for free speech keep open the possi-
bility that at a later date we may Lochnerize and Hellerize the First 
Amendment. 
Americans have consistently integrated free speech rights into the 
broader constitutional themes of the day.53 Conservative libertarians dur-
ing the late nineteenth century integrated the freedom of speech and the 
freedom of contract. New Deal and Great Society liberals integrated the 
freedom of speech and the right to vote. Post-Great Society liberals 
maintain that free speech rights are an aspect of the broader constitu-
tional principles that justified constitutional rights to abortion and an an-
49. See Mich~el Steven Green, Why Protect Private 1\rms Possession? llline Theories of' the Sec-
ond llmendment. 84 Ncrnu- DA\1F L. REv.l31, 172-73 (2008). 
50. See Gregory P. M~garian , Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First 1\mendment Destabi-
lizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49 (2012). 
51. See THOMAS I. E\1ERSO~. TOWARD A GEI\FRAI. THFORY <W THE FIRST A\1FI\IJMENT 
( 1966); AU-XANIJf-1~ MEIKLEJOHN, FI~FF SPEECH A~IJ ITS REI .ATIO~ TO SELF-GOVFRI\MENT (1948). 
52. See GARY JEFFREY JACOHSOHI\, COI\STITUTIOI\AI. IDENTITY 4-5 (2010). 
53 . See notes 1 &-35 and accomp~nying text, infra. 
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ti-subordination interpretation of Brown. Many contemporary oppo-
nents of gun control laws derive their broad interpretation of the Second 
Amendment from the same principles they believe support free speech 
rights. 
Proponents of broad free speech rights before the late nineteenth 
century similarly tied free speech rights to broader constitutional themes. 
In defending John Peter Zenger, Alexander Hamilton emphasized the 
close connection between free speech and jury trials.14 The Virginia and 
Kentucky Resolutions weaved together free speech rights and the com-
pact theory of the constitution.55 James Madison's "Report on the 
Virginia Resolutions" noted how the American commitment to popular 
sovereignty entailed a different understanding of free speech than the 
English commitment to Parliamentary sovereignty. 56 Abolitionists closely 
tied free speech rights to their anti-slavery commitments.57 The motto of 
the Free Soil party was ''Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, Free 
Men."5~ Michael Kent Curtis details how these connections between 
speech rights and anti-slavery structured the post-Civil War 
Amendments. 59 
Other strands of free speech thinking and doctrine are largely inde-
pendent of broader constitutional themes. From Tunis Workman to 
Thomas Emerson, scholars have produced major tomes devoted exclu-
sively to free speech problems.M• Emerson's The System of Freedom of 
Expression is devoted entirely to role free speech plays in a constitution-
al democracy, and not to any broader constitutional vision.~>1 Although he 
played an active role in the fight to constitutionalize a right to birth con-
trol,62 Emerson's writings on free speech do not connect Griswold v. 
Connecticuf'3 and the First Amendment.<" First Amendment rights in the 
54. See JOHI'\ PET!-'!~ ZEI'\Gl-'R, A Bl~ll-'1' NARRA'IIVE OF I'Hl-' CASE Al'\D TRIAl. <)I' JOH" Pl-'Tl-'1~ 
ZENGER (London 173:-1) (Paul Finklcman cd. 2010). 
55 . See Henry Steele CommJger, The Kenfllcky and Virginia Resolutions of' 1798, in 
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICA" HISTORY 17:-1--l-)3 (Henry Steele Commagcr ed., 7th ed. 1%2). 
56. James Madison. Mr. Madison's Report on the Virginia Resollltions, 2 THE ExA\1I"ER A"n J. 
POL. Eco".6S (Condy Ragueted. 11>35). 
57. MICHAl-'!. Kl-'1'\ I' CL:RTIS, FREE SPEECH, "TH!-' PH)PU·.'S DARI.I"(i PI~IVII.f-.(if-.;" S muGGU-S 
FOR FR!-'1-'DOM OF EXPRFSSIO" IN AM!-'RICA" HISTORY 216-'-Jl} (2010). 
51>. THH)I)()RE CI.AI~Kl-' SMI I'H, THE LIHERTY Al'\D FREE SOil. PARTIES i " TH f-. NOR I'HIVEST 14\l 
(1:-197). 
59. Curtis, supra note 57, Jt 357--l-)3. 
60. See TL:"IS WORK\1A", A TREATISE CO"CER"ING POLITICAL E"OLIRY A" I) '!'HE LIHFRTY 
OF THE PR!-'SS (1):100); TH0\1AS l. E\1EI~SON, THE SYS'l'FM OF FI~FFDOM OF EXPR!-'SSI<)l'\ (1'!70). 
61. Emerson discussed the role other constitutional provisions played in maintaining speech 
rights. hut not the ways in which speech rights maintained values advanced by other constitutionJI 
provisions. See, e.g., EM!-'RSO", supra note 60, at 3-20. 
62. See DAVII) J. (;ARROW, LIHEinY & Sl-'XL:AUTY: THE RIGH 1''1'0 PI~IVACY AND 'I HE MAKII'\(i 
<W ROr. v. WIIIJI-'231-3:-1 (1Y'J4). 
63 . 3:-11 u.s. 479 (1965). 
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cia\ equality or free speech without mention of the other, both racial 
equality and free speech have distinctive and partly autonomous devel-
opmental paths.'1 
The partial autonomy of the First Amendment reflects the distinc-
tive role free speech plays in American constitutionalism, The constitu-
tional visions underlying Lochner, Brown, Roe, Harper, Heller and other 
constitutional decisions are not as etched in constitutional stone as is a 
single-executive or, better yet, state equality in the Senate. The latter are 
part of ''the constitutional of settlement''72 that cannot be changed with-
out a constitutional amendment (if even that) in the case of state equality 
in the Senate. The former are part of "the constitution of conversation,"7 ' 
interpretive choices that Americans are free to revise in light of changed 
and perhaps better constitutional commitments. These conversations 
about the fundamental constitutional norms that should guide the proper 
interpretation of the First Amendment do not take place in an entirely 
neutral marketplace of constitutional ideas. A constitutional regime that 
is committed to the freedom of contract and the right to an abortion, but 
not an anti-subordination understanding of equality or the right to bear 
arms will Lochnerize and gRoe the First Amendment, but not 
Harperoon, Hellerize, or Brown free speech. The resulting constitutional 
choices will privilege practices that reinforce existing constitutional 
commitments while placing new obstacles to achieving alternative consti-
tutional visions. Given that all ideological schemes are "mobilizations of 
bias,''74 such privileging is inevitable. Nevertheless, free speech also 
stands for the principle that government may not entrench a particular 
constitutional vision, that the First Amendment must always be inter-
preted as providing dissenters from the dominant regime commitments 
with a fair, if imperfect, opportunity to persuade others to adopt an al-
ternative constitutional vision. Even if we prefer to adopt Tsesis's theory 
of free speech that privileges commitments to democratic majoritarian-
ism, personal development and antisubordination, the First Amendment 
reminds us that we must nevertheless permit some speech that risks anti-
democratic outcomes, hinders personal development, and silences some 
speakers. If, after all, progressives are committed to free speech, that 
commitment entails a confidence that on a not totally slanted market-
place of ideas, the progressive vision that Harperoons, gRoes, and 
Browns the constitution and First Amendment will be more persuasive 
71 . One might note that war has been especially good for racial equality, but not so good for free 
speech. 
72. Sanford V. Levinson. What are We to Do 11bow D}~~timction? Reflections on Stmctural Con-
stitlltional Change and the Irrelevance of Clever Lawyering, Y4 Bosror-; U.L. REV. 1127, 1136 (2014). 
73 . hi. 
74. See E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S V I EW OF 
D EMOCRACY IN A\1ERICA 6Y (1%0). 
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than a conservative vision that Lochnerizes and Hellerizes the constitu-
tion and First Amendment.75 
75. See (;r~bcr, supra note 24, at 3!)3-!)9. 
